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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALAN C. THO.MSON, ERNEST L. 
WILKINSON and SIDNEY 1\1. 
HORMAN, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
NICK J. CONDAS, CHRIS J. 
CONDAS, MARY CONDAS LEH-
MER, ELLEN CONDAS BAYAS 
and ALEXANDRA C 0 ND A S 
OCKEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
12458 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATE.MENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This case was filed by the Plaintiff, who seeks 
to establish that a right-of-way exists from state high-
way 248 across the extreme south of Defendants' land 
(Lot 2 and the SW * of the NE * of Section 5, 
Range 4 East, Township 2 South, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian to land belonging to Plaintiffs in Section 5, 
Township 2 South, Range 4 East and Section 33 Town-
2 
ship 1 South Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and 
.. l\Ieridian. All located in Summit County, Utah. 
Plaintiffs claim a right-of-way based upon public 
use for a period in excess of ten years and a dedication 
by Federal Government according to Statute. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found no public user in the speci-
fically described right-of-way and found for the De-
fendants, no cause of action. The lower court also 
found no public user in the "lower road." 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs maintain that there has been a con· 
tinuous and uninterrupted ingress and egress into Plain· 
tiffs' property either over the lower road or the upper ' 
or quarry road since at least as early as 1894, and that 
such use established an easement in Plaintiffs' pre· 
decessors in Title and in the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs 
appeal from the findings and conclusions as not con· 
forming to the evidence. Plaintiffs seek a reversal of 
the lower court and to have the case rewarded for addi-
tional evidence describing a right-of-way over the 
"lower road." 
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STATE.M:ENT OF FACTS 
In 1894 there was an operating quarry on the 
"quarry mountain" called the Metropolitan Quarry 
(R 333) and stone was being shipped by railroad. The 
Superintendent of l\fetropolitan Stone married a sister 
of witness Vernon Snyder, and they visited back and 
forth frequently (R 334). There was a wagon road 
that went below and up into the quarry area (R 335) 
(Center of SE % of NE % of Section 5) where build-
ings were located during the operation of the quarry 
(R 335). Witness's sister and husband lived in a cottage 
near the other buildings. There was also a large bunk-
house used for laborers at the quarry to make their beds 
in; there was a stable for horses and a blacksmith shop; 
perhaps an ice house. All the buildings were frame ex-
cept the boarding house ( R 335) . Witness and family 
visited married sister frequently at the quarry using 
horses and horse drawn vehicles (R 337). On these 
visits the witness and his family followed the lower 
road (R 337). 'Vitness lived with his sister at the 
quarry when she was anticipating confinement for birth 
of a baby ( R 338). There was quite a group of men 
working there-between fifteen and twenty at the time 
( R 338) . There were Chinese cooks who slept at the 
boarding house and workers who slept at the bunkhouse 
(R 338). There were two Chinese cooks, a Superin-
tendent and his wife, and workers-possibly twenty-five 
people ( R 339) . 
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A l\Ir. Custer operated the quarry later (R 340). 
During this time there was no fence or obstruction to 
the road (R 342). For a time after closing the quarry, 
a family named Garn lived in the bunkhouse. There was 
no way for them to get in and out except by use of the 
lower roadway ( R 343) . 
When the quarry closed down, Vernon Snyder's 
brother bought pigs and drove them down the road 
(R 345). Snyder stated the lower road was the only 
service road he knew of ( R 345) . 
At one time there were as many as two hundred 
men working in the quarry (R 97). The lower road 
was used as ingress and egress to the quarry between 
1915 and 1920 (R 179 and 184). 
When the Condas family first went on the property 
in 1928 and 1929, the "upper" or quarry road did not 
exist except as an old railroad grade-"kind of a scar 
on the hill" ( R 11) . The lower road was there in 1929 
( R 11) . There had been a railroad serving the quarry, 
and it was removed sometime between 1924 and 1926 
(R 128). The lower road was used by Condas in 1927. 
The railroad grade was gradually made useable for ve-
hicular traffic (R 329 and 13). 
Hugh Balser, a Manager for Bamberger Com· 
pany, testified that in 1926 there was ingress and egress 
on the old railroad grade and the County road through 
the lower part (R 104). Also, there was a bunkhouse 
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and repair sheds. Egress from the bunkhouse was on 
the "County road" (R 105). He also testified that 
Exhibit P 5 represented features on the land and the 
lower road as shown on the map. 1'1Iarcellen stated that 
he had seen people down "in here go squirrel hunting, 
fishing and things like that (R 215). 
Chris Condas testified that the lower road ran to 
a "bunch of buildings" ( R 268). Gerald Hanley used 
the lower road ( R 27 4) . Gerald Hanley used lower 
road and _Mills road (R 282). He also saw a number of 
cars parked along lower road (R 283). William P. Sul-
livan stated that he saw the lower road being used at 
times (R 291). 
Condas built a fence along the west side of their 
property in 1929 ( R 22) to comply with homestead re-
quirements. The fense had a stock gate. After patent 
was granted, neither the fence nor the gate was serious-
ly maintained (R 30). 
Beginning in 1934, a chain was placed across the 
developing upper road by the Plaintiffs' predecessors 
in title to preclude stone theft. The chain was main-
tained until 1958 or 1959 by the various lessees of the 
Plaintiffs or their predecessors in interest. 
In 1958 or 1959, the chain was moved to a point on 
the Plaintiffs' predecessors property. Between that time 
and the present, there has been no restriction to use of 
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the upper road except the barricade erected in 1967 by 
the Defendants. 
Between 1929 and the present, the use of the lower 
road has declined and the use of the quarry or upper 
road has increased. Sheep herds have gone in and out, 
using the lower road and the upper quarry road (R 326). 
Up until the last year or two (R 326 and 327) both the 
lower road and the upper quarry road have been used 
for this purpose. 
Since the property was acquired by the Plaintiffs, 
the chain has not been maintained on the quarry road . 
.Some use of the lower road has continued to the present 
time. 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
FIND THAT THERE WAS A PUBLIC USE 
OF THE LOWER ROAD. 
Without being repetitious in citing the testimony 
upon which this case is based, it appears that the fol· 
lowing facts are developed and not controverted in 
testimony: 
A. That from 1894 to the present, there has been 
in existence a lower road leading to the center of Sec· 
tion 5, Township 2 South. 
B. That the lower road was the service road for 
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a community of at least twenty persons in 1894, and 
that at one time serviced the quarry community and the 
employment of two hundred men. People went in and 
out on visits, to bring in food, to drive out pigs and no 
other known access was testified to. 
C. As long as the railroad remained ( 1924) the 
lower road served as ingress and egress for the quarry 
and the lower road was used for sheep trailing as late 
as 1931 and 1932. The lower road continues to be used 
by the public and there is no obstruction of that road 
on the Defendants' property. 
It would appear that in 1894 and for some years 
thereafter the area served by the lower road was a min-
ing community, and even after Metropolitan Stone 
Company stopped operating the quarry, the lower road 
serviced the quarry area for employees and workman. 
(The stone was being removed by railroad). 
It would appear that the rights established back as 
far as 1894 are such that if the quarry expanded its 
production, it would (by the peadings) be entitled to 
use the upper road for transportation of stone (changed 
from railroad to truck) and for use of the lower road, 
for all supportive quarry services including residential 
community. This appears to be established by the evi-
dence. 
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POINT II 
THE USE OF BOTH THE UPPER QUAR-
RY ROAD AND THE LOWER ROAD WAS 
ESTABLISIIED FOR A P E R I 0 D OF 
THIRTY-NINE YEARS PRIOR TO PATENT 
(SEE STATEl\IENT OF FACTS) AND CON-
STITUTED A PUBLIC USER AND DEDICA-
TION. 
Title 27-12-89, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
Amended states: 
A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the 
public when it has been continuously used as 
a public thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
(Repeated identically worded Section con-
tained in the laws of 1880 and laws of 1886, 
Chapter 12, Section 2.) 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended, also 
states 27-12-90: 
All public highways once established shall 
continue to be highways until abandoned or 
vacated by order of the highway authorities 
having jurisdiction over such highway or by 
other competent authority. Also, revised 
statutes 1898, Section 1116. 
United States Code Annotated, 1953, Chapter 43, 
Section 932 states: 
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the right-of-way for the construction of 
highways over public lands not reserved for 
public use is hereby granted. 
The uncontroverted evidence in this case indicates 
that the lower road was used from 1894 up through 
1933, and the use was such as to support a dedication 
of the public highway and as such the lower road would 
be exempt from any patent granted to the Defendants. 
In United States versus 9,947.71 acres of land, 
220 Federal Supplement, 328, the Court stated: 
Where owners of valid mining claim built 
access road over public domain in accordance 
with local custom, Title to right-of-way vested 
in mining claim owners and subsequent toll 
road and eminent domain proceedings did not 
diminsh rights of owners to right-of-way so far 
as the United States was concerned. 
In Oregon Short-line Railway Company versus 
Murray City, 1954, 277 Pacific 2nd 798 2 Utah 2nd 
427, the Court stated: 
This action was intended to grant an ease-
ment and the railroad could not acquire title 
to property thereunder. 
In 80 Pacific 267 37 Wa. 682, the Court stated: 
This section is a grant in praesenti and 
when accepted by the public it took effect as 
of the date of the grant. 
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The Utah Court in Lindsay Land and Livestock 
Company versus Churnos, 75 Utha 384, 285 P. 646 
stated: 
Use of road over public lands belonging 
to Federal Government as public thoroughfare 
for eighteen years, a time in excess of that re-
quired by law, ( 1880 Chapter 29, Sec. 2 and 
1886 Chapter 12 Section 2) for creation of a 
public highway held sufficient in law to amount 
to acceptance of a grant of right-of-way over 
public lands, and therefore constituted road a 
public highway by dedication. 
Perhaps the case most in point in the Utah State 
is the case of Sullivan versus Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 
P. 954. This case is particularly interesting since it in-
volves predecessors in interest to Condas, one of the 
parties in this case, and to Sullivan, one of the wit-
nesses in the case. In the Sullivan versus Condas case, 
Sullivan sought to enjoin the tresspass of Condas over 
an alleged private roadway or right-of-way. The Plain· 
tiff in that case alleged that the right-of-way was a 
public highway, and that such for more than sixty years 
had been continuously used by the Defendant, his 
predecessors in interest and the public generally with 
the knowledge and acquiescence of the Plaintiffs and 
their predecessors until shortly before the commence· 
ment of the action. He further alleged that the roadway 
was the only means of ingress and egress to and from 
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the Defendant's premises on which valuable improve-
ments had been made. The Court goes on to state that 
there was evidence that as early as 1873, the roadway 
extended up and down the canyon over the lands owned 
by the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and others, while 
such lands were part of the public domain, it was 
traveled and used by the public . 
. . . the patent to a land issued, the predecessors 
in interest of the Plaintiffs was issued in 
1906, about 33 years thereafter. The right-
of-way having been established over public 
lands by public user, the predecessors of the 
Plaintiffs when the patent was issued to them, 
and the Plaintiffs when they acquired their 
interest in and to the land took them subject 
to an easement in favor of the public unless it 
was thereafter extinguished by operation of 
state law. 
This case appears to have a distinct parallel in the 
present case. 
The lower road was in use from 1894 to 1933, a 
period of 39 years prior to the granting of a patent to 
Condas. An easement and right-of-way had been 
established for a period of 39 years prior to the patent 
and the patent was therefore excepted the public high-
way established therein since no statutory action has 
been taken to abandon the highway use. 
There seems to be only the question of quantitative 
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evidence. How much and how great a use makes a prop-
erty a public road. 'V" ould the travel of one thousand 
employees to a mining camp constitute a public use. 
Would the travel of 200 employees such as testified to 
in this case constitute a public use. Plaintiff maintains 
that a public user was established by competent evidence 
and respectfully requests that the case be remanded to 
the Trial Court for the determination of a description 
and width of the public highway. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
431 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
